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Part II Eyoluti on of Sexual Harassment Claims

A...
MINIMIZING EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN FEDERAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CLAIMS AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS AC!r OF 1991
by
Bruce L. Haller* and Richard

c.

Aitken**

Part I Introduction
The seriousness of sexual harassment was firmly
established by the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings held by
the Senate Judiciary committee in october, 1.991. 1
The
hearings directed the country's attention to the shortcomings
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of raee, color, religion, sex or
natural origin. 2 According to the 1.981 u.s. Merit system
Protection Board Report, forty-two percent of the women who
were questioned had answered that they had been subjected to
some form of sexual harassment. 3 Unfortunately, in 1988 when
the Board conducted the same survey, the results were
identical4 ; moreover, the percentage was even greater in male
do11inated workplaces. '
The victims of sexual harassment6 not only become less
efficient employees, but also suffer depression, loss of
confidence as well as, physical effects. 7 In addition to the
toll it takes on the employee, sexual harassment costs the
federal government over a hundred million dollars a year. 8
The money represents the cost of absenteeism, reduced
productivity, job turnover, medical costs, and litigation. 9
Finally, sexual harassment creates an offensive working
condition that alienates its victims and decreases job morale.
It is therefore in the best interests of employers,
employees and soci ety to prevent all forms of sexual
harassment.
Short of this employers ean take steps to
minimize their liability in Title VII s exual harassment
claims.
Part II of this article will review the evolution of
sexual harassment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Part III outlines how the 1964 Act was changed
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Part IV outlines the
procedures an employer may implement to minimize their
liability.
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Background

Although sexual harassment10 is currently actionable
under Title VII, claims of -sexual harassment had fallen on
deaf ears until 1976. 11 Prior to this, the courts had held
that victims of sexual harassment had no recourse under Title
VII. 12 For example, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in Barnes v. Train denied a plaintiff
relief under Title VII because she had not been discriminated
against on the basis of her sex, but rather on the basis of
her refusal to submit to the sexual advances.n Thus, in
order to recover a plaintiff had to use the traditional tort
theories of assault, battery, defamation, or intentional
infliction of emotiopal distress. 14
It should be noted that, even though Title VII was
proposed to eliminate all barriers to employment for all, the
provision regarding sex discrimination was only added as a
last-minute attempt to defeat the act. 15 Presently Title VII
not only prohibits sex discrimination in all of its forms,
section 704 of Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating
against employees who initiate complaints •.16
In 1976 the District court of the District of Columbia
became the first district court to recognize a sexual
harassment claim under Title VII . 17
The plaintiff, Diane
Williams, who was an employee of the Justice Department
refused to submit to sexual advances of her supervisor. In
response, her supervisor retaliated with unfavorable reviews
and unwarranted reprimands.
The district court determined
that the supervisor's retaliatory measures discriminated
against Ms. Williams on the basis of her sex and was therefore
a violation of Title
In the aftermath of Williams, courts started to recognize
sexual harassment as actionable action under Title VII.
However, a majority of the courts required that the plaintiff
show a loss of a tangible job benefit. a
This type of
harassment has been referred to as quid pro quo harassment or
"this for that" harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment
involves conduct of a sexual nature when submission to such
conduct is made explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of employment or when submission or rejection of such conduct
is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting the
Therefore when a supervisory employee conditions
concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, he imposes an
additional burden on subordinate employees that they need not
suffer. As a result, an employer may be sued for the action
of the supervisor . 21
The Equal Employment Opportunity Co:mmission drafted a set
of guidelines regarding the problem of sexual harassment in
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the workplace.n The guidelines reinforced the various court
rulings regarding quid pro quo harassment and then went a step
further, defining sexual harassment as:
(R)equests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection
of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, bostile, or offensive work
enviroll111ent23
According to the EEOC's
a plaintiff does not
have to show that she suffered from a loss of tangible job
benefit but rather that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual
advances, jokes, suggestive remarks or comments, physical
touching, or the displaying of objectional material in the
workplace rising to the level of creating an offensive or
hostile working environment. 25 The hostile work environment
claim differs from the quid pro quo claim, because it is not
limited to harassment by one with authority to make
substantive employment decisions.
To promote hostile work environment as a valid claixa for
sexual harassment, the EEOC's guidelines call for the strict
liability for employers regardless of whether they knew or
should have known of the discriminatory acts of its agents or
supervisors. The guidelines state:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, ••. is
responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of
were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known of their occurrence. The commission will examine
the
circumstances
of the particular
employment
relationship and the job function performed by the
individual in determining whether an individual acts in
either a supervisory or agency capacity. 26 After the
release of the Guidelines, the courts agreed that hostile
enviromnent sexual harassment claims are actionable under
Title VII77 • In Bundy y, Jackson28 the circuit court for
the District of Columbia announced that hostile work
environment sexual harassment violates Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. The court based its decision on
Title VII race discrimination
The court stated:
Indirect discrimination is illegal because it may
constitute a subtle scheme designed to create a working

environment imbued with discrimination and directed
ultimately at minority group employees. As potentially
discriminated _practices become outlawed, those employers
bent on pursuing a general policy declared illegal by
congressional mandate will undoubtedly devise more
sophisticated methods to perpetrate discrimination among
Qlllployees. 30
The circuit court in Bundy recognized both quid pro quo
and hostile environment sexual harassment. The court stated
that by only allowing quid pro quo actions the courts are
condoning the actions of employers who sexually harass their
workers but stop before dismissing or depriving an employee of
a tangible job
In similar fashion, the Eleventh Circuit held that
hostile environment sexual harassment violates Title VII in
Henson y. Ci t v of Dundee. 32 Barbara Henson was a dispatcher
for the city of Dundee's police department. She claimed that
during the two years she had worked for the department she and
her female eo-workers were subject to "numerous harangues of
demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities."" :rn addition,
she alleged that her supervisor had repeatedly asked her to
have sexual relations with him. In reversing the lower Courts
decision, which denied her claim because she had not lost a
tangible job be nefit, the court set forth a five point
analytical frame work for hostile environment claim.
According to Henson, the elements for a prima facie case
of hostile environment sexual harassment are (1) the employee
belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected
to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained
of was based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected
a "term, condition or privilege" of employment; (5) employer
knew or should
known of the harassment in question and
failed to take prompt remedial
Meritor Sayings Bank FSB v
In 1986, the issue of sexual harassment reached the
United States Supreme Court. 36 In 1974, Michelle Vinson,
respondent, met Sidney Taylor of Capital City Federal Savings
and Loan Association (now Meritor Savings Bank) and discussed
the possibility of employment. Vinson was eventually hired
with Taylor as her supervisor and started as a teller-trainer.
Thereafter she was promoted to teller, head teller, and
assistant Branch Manager. She worked at the same branch for
four years and i t is . undis puted that all of her promotions
were based on merit. 37 In September of 1978 Vinson notified
Taylor that she was taking sick leave for an indefinite period
and on November 1, 1978, she was discharged from the bank for
excessive use of that leave.
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Pursuant to this Vinson brought a Title VII action
against Taylor and the bank alleging that "she bad been
constantly subjected to sexual harassment" by Taylor. 38
At trial, Vinson testified that shortly after her
probationary period was concluded Taylor had asked her out to
dinner and while at dinner he suggested that they go to a
motel and have sexual relations. out of what she described as
fear of losing her job, Vinson agreed.
Vinson further
testified that Taylor had made repeated sexual demands upon
her and that during the course of her employment she had
intercourse with him 40-50 times: In addition, she testified
that Taylor had fondled her in front of other employees,
followed her into the ladies room, exposed himself to her, and
forcibly raped her several
The District Court held for Taylor and the Bank.
court concluded that:

The

[if) Vinson and Taylor did engage in an intimate sexual
relationship, during the time of her employment with the
bank, the relationship was a voluntary one having nothing
to do with her continued employment with the bank or her
advancement for promotions at the
The court also concluded that the bank was not in violation of
Title VII because "the bank was without notice and cannot be
held liable for the alleged actions of Taylor••. 41
The District Court's holdinq was reversed by the court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.QDrawing support from
its decision in Bundy y. Jacksonc and the EEOC Guidelines the
court announced that a violation Gf Title VII may be based
upon either quid pro quo sexual harassment or hostile
environment sexual harassment. Therefore since the Appellate
Court believed that Vinson's allegations were clearly of the
hostile environment
and concluded the District Court
had not addressed the issue, the court remanded the case.
In regard to the bank's liability the Court of Appeals
held that an employer is absolutely liable for the sexually
harassing conduct of its supervisory p&rsonnel, regardless of
whether the employee knew or should have known about the
misconduct. The Court concluded that Title VII's definition
of "employer" includes "any agent of such person", 4S
Therefore, the court held that a supervisor is an agent of his
employer for Title VII purposes.%
The court of Appeals' decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, but on other grounds.
The court determined
that "the language of Title VII is not limited to "economic"
or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase "terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment" evidences a legislative intent
"to strike at this entire spectrum of disparate treatment of

men and women.
" 47
The court also relied on the EEOC
41
Guidelines in determining that sexual·harassment, regardless
of whether or not there is any loss of a tangible job benefit
is actionable under. Title VII. The court did however, caution
that:
Not all workplace conduct that may be described as
"harassment" affects a ''term, condition, or privilege" or
employment within the meaning of Title VII. For sexual
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the
actions] employment and create an abrasive working
environment. 1149
In regard to employer liability the Court disagreed with
the Court of Appeals' decision that employers should be held
absolutely liable for the conduct of its
Although the court refused to give a definitive answer on
employer liability, it did agree with the amicus curiae brief
by the EEOC which stated "that Congress wanted courts to look
to agency principles for guidance in this area.s1
Finally, the court rejected the bank's view that the
existence of a grievance procedure and policy against
discrimination, insulates the bank from liability.
The
the . court gave are two-fold. First, the bank's po_licy
not address sexual harassment in particular. Secondly,
the bank's procedure required an employee to report any
discrimination to her supervisor. Therefore, since Taylor was
Vinson's supervisor it is quite evident why she did not choose
to implement the grievance procedure.»
Burdens of Proof in Sexual Harassment Cases
Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Quid pro quo sexual harassment claims are similar to the
traditional discrimination claims under Title VII. Therefore,
in order to establish a quid pro quo claim53 a plaintiff must
use the tripartite framework for proving a Title VII claim of
disparate treatment established by the supreme court in
McDonnell Poualas Corp . v.
The plaintiff must first
establish by a
of the evidence she was denied
a tangible job benefit because she refused to submit to the
sexual advances of her supervisor. Upon doing so the burden
of proof shifts back to the employer to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that it had a legitimate, non
discriminatory reason for denying the plaintiff of this
benefit. Finally, if the employer is able to meet this burden
of proof, the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that the
employer' s stated "legitimate" reason is pretextual and
unworthy of credence, s5
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Evidence of sexual advances made to other employees may
be admitted on this issue of motive, intent, or plan in making
the sexual advances toward the plaintiff. 56 In regards to
imputing liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment, the
federal courts have held employers strictly liable, based on
agency
For example, in the Sixth Circuit case
of Shrout v. The Black. Clawson co." the District Court for
the southern District of Ohio found the employer stri ctly
liable for the acts of a supervisor who attempted to force the
plaintiff ''to submit to his sexual advances bj withholding
performance evaluations and salary reviews."
The court
stated :
Respondeat superior liability exists because in a quid
pro quo action "an employer is held strictly liable for
the conduct of supervisory employees having plenary
authority over hiring, advancement, dismissal and
discipline ••• " 110
similarly, in sowers y. Kemira61 the District court for the
southern District of Georgia held an employer strictly liable
for quid pro quo sexual harassment by its supervisor, Mr.
Skinner.
The court records show that Mr. Skinner made
numerous sexual advances to the plaintiff, many of which
occurred during discussion regarding the possibility of her
promotion.
Citing Henson y. City of Dundee, the district
court held the employer liable on the basis of agency because
the supervisor was using "his apparent or actual authority to
extort sexual consideration from an employee .•• {T]he
supervisor uses the means furnished to him by the employer to
accomplish the prohibited purpose." 62
Opponents to implying strict liability on employers argue
that supervisors who practice quid pro quo sexual harasSl'llent
are acting outside of their scope of employment. Therefore,
their argument continues, an employer should not be held
liable for the consequences of these acts. 63
Although at
first this appears to be a valid defense, upon c l oser
examination this theory is flawed.
While it is correct that a master is not liable for the
torts of his servants committed while acting outside their
scope of employment, the Restatement (second) of Agency lists
four exceptions to the general rule. The two exceptions which
are applicable to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims are
that the:
(b)

"master was negligent or reckless, or •..

(d)

The servant purported to act or to speak on behalf
of the principal and there was reliance upon
apparent
authority,
or
he
was
aided
in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation."

The first exception cited is
in the Eighth
circuit case of Hall v. Gus Construction co •• <>s In .H2ll the
plaintiffs were a group of women who work on one of the
co11pany•s crews and were subj ect to various sorts of sexual
harassment by their
Although the court
acknowledges that the harassment was not within the scope of
employment it still imposed liability on the employer stating:
[A)n employer is directly liable •• • for those torts
committed against one employee by another, whether or not
committed in furtherance of the employer's business, that
the employer could have prevented by reasonable care in
hiring, supervising, or if necessary firing the tort
feasor.({l
Therefore, although an act of sexual harassment may be outside
the scope of employment, the employer may still be held liable
if the plaintiff can prove that the employer was negligent in
hiring, or supervising the supervisor.
Strict liability may be imposed by the second
aforementioned exception when the supervisor uses the
existence of the agency relation to accomplish his tort. This
exception is the very basis upon which quid pro quo sexual
harassment claims are based. By simply being in the position
to hire, make recommendations, promote, supervise, and fire an
employee, a supervisor has the
and power by the
existence of his agency relationship with the employer, to
carry out all forms of sexual harassment.
It would,
therefore, be grossly inequitable to refuse to impose direct
liability on an employer when one of its supervisors uses his
relationship with his employer to sexually harass employees
under him.
Hostile Environment Harassment
The primary procedure to proving a hostile environment
sexual harassment was set forth by the eleventh circuit in
Henson v. City of
The court made it demonstrably
clear that an employee 's psychological well being is a term
and condition of employment. The court further declared that
the issue of sexual harassment must be viewed under the
totality of circumstances.
Finally, once the plaintiff
establishes the five elements outlined in Henson the second
and third step of the McDonnell Doug las test are triggered.
The Henson test has not been used without criticism. The
element concerning the unwelcomeness of the harassment, as
well as, the element regarding employer liability has
come
under fire.
The sixth circuit case of Rabidue y. osceola
Refining co • . 70 provides an excellent illustration of the
shortcomings of the unwelcomeness requirement.
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Vivienne Rabidue was the only female administrative
assistant at the Osceola Refining Company.
After her
discharge in 1977, she filed a sexual harassment claim against
her employer, She charged that her employer's refusal to stop
the display of pornographic posters in private offices and
common work areas at the company plant, as well as anti-female
obscenities directed at her and other women by a co-worker in
another department, constituted sexual discrimination in
violation of Title VII. 71 Furthermore, she introduced evidence
that she had been denied various managerial privileges
accorded to male employees and in other ways had been given
secondary status in the company,n
The conduct which Rabidue complained of was not mild and
ambiguous. Pictures of nude and scantily clad women abounded
at the company, including one that had hung on the wall for
eight years. This poster depicted a prone women with a golf
ball on her breasts, straddled by a man holding a golf club
and yelling, "Fore". 73 The language of co-workers was equally
offensive. They engaged in generally uncooperative behavior
that
i.Jipaired Rabidue's ability to perform her
job
effectively,,.
In writing for the majority, and applying the "reasonable
man" standard in deciding whether or not the conduct
complained of was unwelcome, Judge Krupansky held that the
conduct complained of was not sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of their employment.
The court
characterized the conduct as a legitimate expression of the
cultural norms of the workers at the employer's plant and
stated:
[I)t cannot be disputed that in some work
environments humor and language are rough hewn and
vulgar.
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and
girlee magazines may abound.
Title VII was not
meant to or can change this.
It must never be
forgotten that Title VII is the federal court's
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment
opportunity for the female workers of America. But
it is quite different to claim that Titl e VII was
designed to bring about a magical transformation in
the social mores of American workers. 75
The court further argued that Rabidue had voluntarily and
knowingly entered the Osceola workplace and therefore could
not
complain
about
the
conditions
she
encountered
Rabidue was denied any relief under Title VII.
Despite the fact that the court attempted to make a
proper assignment regarding the alleged sexual harassment at
osceola, the opinion in Rabidue reflected patriarchal
attitudes about women. In the court's assertion that a proper
assessment of a hostile environment claim includes evidence

about the personality of the plaintiff, n the court minimized
the conduct engaged in at Osceo1a and reflected the common
male attitude that the victim of harassment is to blame for
her mistreatment."
Many men believe that women can avoid
harassment if they behave properly and that the tactful
of a complaint is usually an effective way of
harassment when it
the court's
:foc1;1s on the character of the victilll110 echoes these :male
and thus undermines the 11 neutrality" of its
It has, therefore, been argued that by employing the
man standard the courts cannot provide a neutral
for the definition of discrimination because the courts
·neutral analysis contains a hidden male perspective. In lieu
of this the dissent in Rabidue advocated the use of the
reasonable victim standard . u
Although the sixth circuit has not expressly overturned
in Rabidue, it bas called Rabidue into
at least two subsequent opinions.
In Yates v ,
, the court stated, "We acknowledge that men and women
are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different
behavior."u
In lieu of this, the court adopted the
"reasonable victim" standard which was one of the main
arguments in the Rabidue dissent.
its

In Dayis v . Monsanto Cbemical Co." the sixth circuit
Rabidue•s
limited
reading
of
Title
VII.
the court qualified its statement in Rabidue
read "Title
[was) not designed to being about a
in the social mores of American
workers."u The court, in Davis, emphasized:
In reading this passage, however, one should place the
emphasis
on
the
word
":magical"
not
the
word
VII was not intended to eliminate
all private prejudice and biases. That law
did alter the dynamics of the workplace
operates to prevent bigots from harassing their coworkers.86
addition to the sixth circuit questioning its decision
in
courts have rejected it in its entirety.
For
1991, the ninth circuit in Ellison y .
adopted the reasonable woman standard as opposed to the
reasonable man standard. Kerry Ellison worked as a revenue
agent for the Internal Revenue service in san Mateo
· 88 Aft er turn1ng
·
Ca l .f
down several requests for dates'
from a co-w?rJ:ter, she began to receive "love letters."39 The
court
rejected the reasoning in Rabidue and
employed the reasonable woman standard because men and women
have different opinions of what type of conduct is
In fact, the court stated that "If we only
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exaDined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly
harassing conduct, we would run the r i sk of reinforcing the
prevailing level of discrimination. 1191 Therefore, a plaintiff
can prove a prima facie case for bostile environment sexual
harassment by showing "conduct which a reasonable woman would
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment."92
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liability. 1113 The fourth circuit in Katz y. Dole•04 further
refined the analytical framework of Henson and opined that:
the plaintiff Jnust . demonstrate that the employer had
actual or
knowledge of the existence of a
sexually hostile working environment and took no prompt
and ade9Uate remedial action. The plaintiff may do this
by
_that complaints were lodged with the employee
or that the harassment was so pervasive that the
employer's
may be inferred. Thus, we posit a
two step
First the plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that sexually harassing actions took place
if
is done, the employer may rebut the showing
by proving the events did not take
indirectly by showing that they were isolated
or tr1v1al.
second, the plaintiff must show that the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
took.no effectual action to correct the situation. 'This
can also be rebutted by the employer directly or
by
to prompt r emedial action
calculated to end the

.A few district courts across the country have also
adopted the reasonable woman standard. In Spencer y. Gener al
Electric co.n, the District court for the Eastern District of
Virginia employed the reasonable woman standard and found
"[t]hat the conduct complained of would have interfered with
the work performance and would have seriously affected the
psychological well-being of a reasonable female employee. 1194
similarl y, the District court f or the Middle District of
Florida in Robinson y. Jacksonville Shipyard . Inc. 95 used the
reasonable woman standard to determine that pervasive
pornographic pictures, sexual
verbal harassment,
abusive graffiti, and unwelcome touching of some of the
plaintiff's female co-workers created a hostile
Finally, as recently as October, 1992, the District court of
Nevada i n Canada v. Tbe Boyd Group.
used the reasonable
woman standard in denying the defendant's motion for summary
judgement. 93
Notwithstanding this seetting emergence of the reasonable
woman standard, the reasonable person standard can not be so
easily discarded.
In the recent unanimous Suprem.e Court
decision regarding Harris, the court discarded the reasonable
woman standard in favor of the reasonable person standard
removing gender from the harassment
The facts of the case reveal that Teresa Harris, a former
rental manager of Forklift systems, was allegedly subjected to
unwanted sexual comments by the owner. Harris accused the
owner of making derogatory comments such as, •• [ 1] et' s go to
the Holiday Inn to negotiate your raise;" forcing Harris and
other female employees to retrieve coins from his front
pocket; and throwing things on the floor, then asking women to
pick them up while he commented suggestively on their
clothes . 100 Although the trial judge acknowledged that the
owner's behavior was crude, vulgar, and offensive, he ruled
against Harris because he found that she had not suffered
serious psychological injury. •m The supreme Court, Harris v
Forklift s ystems . Inc., struck down the narrow interpretation
of the federal sexual harassment law, instead taking a middle
of the road approach stating, "a discriminatory abusive work
environment, even one that does not seriously affect the
employee's psychological well-being, can and often will
detract from the employee's job performance, discourage
employees from
on the job or keep them from
advancing their careers . " 02

Notwithstanding which standard is used, once a plaintiff
that the sexual harassment has in fact occurred he or
burdened with the additional task of proving employer

.
and
superv

its own rule, the court in Katz imposed
on the
even though the agency did have an
policy
place because it was not effective
known to be not effective by the employer's
106

Not all
have been as fortunate as Ms. Katz.
The seventh
t
held
a female factory worker
failed . to
a
VII cla1m when her claim was based
a
in which a co-worker made crude physical
Jokes 1n
of a sexual advance and the employees
promptly d1scipl1ned the co-worker and the behavior was not
a discharged engineering technician
fal.led to establ1sh a claim of hostile environment sexual
harassment at.a glass factory where sexually suggestive nude
photos were
at the plant. The use of gender-based
references . to personnel, and whis tles from male co-workers
were met
prompt, remedial management
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Part III - The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Legal liability for unlawful acts of sexual harassment is
now accompanied by significant monetary liability as a result
of the civil Rights Act of
Signed by President Bush
on November 21, 1991, the Act has implemented a series of
sweeping changes to federal anti-discrimination laws that
expands the scope and amount of monetary relief available to
prevailing plaintiffs, and also expands the types of conduct
that may be deemed discriminatory under the law • 110 The Act
went into effect on the date of enactment and is not
retroactive. 111
With passage of the amended law, a sexually harassed
employee can now sue for more than the remedies ,available
under Title VII which are injunctive relief and/or
reinstatement, back pay, front pay and attorney• s fees.
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for the
possibility of recovery of compensatory punitive damages for
victims of intentional employment discrimination on the basis
of sex, religion, and disability. 112
A sexually harassed
employee may therefore, sue for the pai n and suffering caused
by the discrimination (compensatory damages) and for an
additional amount that serves to punish the employer (punitive
da.mages). 113 Punitive damages are available when the employer
deliberately planned to discriminate against an employee or
acted without caring whether or not the employee would suffer
when it was obvious that the employee would suffer. 114
The damage awards granted under the new act are capped at
$50,000 for companies of 100 or fewer workers, $100,000 for
companies with 101 to 200 employees, $200,000 for employers
with 201 to 500 employees and $300,000 for employees of over
500 employees.m
In addition, jury trials are now available in Title VII
claims by any party to a discrimination action if the
complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages. 116
FUrthermore, since experts play an important role in sexual
harassment cases, 117 the 1991 Act provides that expert witness
fees are available in Title VII cases.m
Part IY Steps Employers Can Take to Ayoid Liability
In addition to refuting the elements to a sexual
harassment claim119 an employer may improve the possibility of
avoiding liability by implementing a strong viable antiharassment policy. A strong policy promotes an understanding
of harassment throughout an organization and makes everyone
aware of the legal consequences of violating the policy.
Having a written policy can reduce the risk of liability
because harassment is least likely to occur when employees are
aware of the rules. 120 As one com.menter has said "Once a

company has a corporate policy, men are much more careful.
Policies make employees more aware. 121
It is therefore
imperative that all companies devise a policy that:

•
•
•

•
•
•

states that sexual harassment will not be tolerated
defines both quid pro quo and hostile environment
harassment
outlines a procedure for employees to make
complaints about sexual harassment to a person with
authority to resolve the complaint.
guarantees that all complaints will be treated
confidentially.
guarantees that employees who complain about sexual
harassment will not suffer adverse job consequences
as a result of the complaint, and
states that an employee who engages in sexual
harassment is subject to discipline up to and
including discharge. 122

The company's policy should be outlined in a memo and
distributed to all employees "using whatever the usual trusted
mechanisms of the company are .•. " 123
The anti-harassment
policy should also be contained, in its entirety, in any
employee handbook that the company may furnish.
The procedure for filing of complaints should encourage
employees to come forward and report the incidents of sexual
harassment.
It is important that there are at least two
employees of the company in high level positions who will
investigate the allegations and make the appropriate
recommendations. It would be prudent to make sure that these
two employees are from different departments in case the
alleged harassment claim is against one of these
All complaints should be handled in a serious matter and
investigated confidentially by trained personnel.
The
investigator should not only investigate the act complained of
but should also find out if the employer was aware of any
other instances of harassment. 1u
Once the investigation is
complete, the investigator should meet with management and
recommend the possible remedial actions that should be taken.
The employer's remedial action should be reasonably
calculated to end the harassment, make the action whole and
prevent any future misconduct. By taking immediate remedial
action, an employer has utilized his best defense to Title VII
claims. 125 Normally if the EEOC finds that the harassment
has been eliminated, the victim made whole, and the preventive
measures instituted, it will normally drop the charge .
In addition to the implementation of a strong antiharassment policy, employers must educate their employees as
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to what conduct the law considers to be sexual harassment.
The education program must stress that any type of UnWelcome
sexual conduct is strictly prohibited.
Furthermore, the
program should stress that an employee who voluntarily
partakes in such conduct may still consider it unwelcome but
feel as if she has no choice but to submit to such conduct.
Finally, educating the employees .about the existence of
and the matter in which an anti-harassment complaint procedure
operates is as important as the details of the procedure
itself. This may be accomplished through training seminars,
that should be ongoing and presented on company time.
Moreover, whatever policy a given company asserts as a defense
will have little effect if the court deems that such policy
was neither known or readily acceptable to the
Part Y

conclusion

In light of the popularity and political correctness of
sexual harass1nent claims since the Thomas hearing, it is
imperative that an employer takes the appropriate steps to
limit his or her liability. Therefore, since the standard for
liability has not yet been clearly expressed by the supreme
Court, the best way for an employe.r to escape liability is
through prevention . The employer should not only implement a
sexual harassment policy, but should also educate their
employees as to what constitutes sexual harassment, develop
appropriate sanctions, and inform employees of their right to
raise the issue under Title VII. Once an employer has done
this, a court will be reluctant to find liability if the
implemented policy had been adhered to.
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COMMERCIAL PAPER FORGERIES:

A COMPLETE

ONE-HOUR LESSON
by
Arthur M. Magaldi*
The members of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business
have increasingly turned their attention and emphasis to the
pedagogical aspect of our profession. This increased interest
in the actual teaching of our material has given rise to many
initiatives, for example, the publication of the Journal of
Legal studies Education and a teaching symposium at the annual
convention of the Academy.
In that collegial spirit of
sharing teaching ideas which have been effectively used in the
classroom, the following material is submitted as a lesson
which students have found to be worthwhile. No suggestion is
made that it is a model lesson.
It is a lesson, however,
which develops in a concise manner a number of principles
concerning commercial paper forgeries. The lesson also
develops a number of learning aids for students.
Implicit in the writing of this paper is the strongly
held belief of the author that it is valuable for teachers of
business lawflegal environment courses to make available to
approaches that have been found pedagogically
effective. The lesson includes some mild attempts at levity,
but they are not essential to the structure of the lesson. An
outline of the lesson is provided in Appendix A.
The lesson on forgeries begins with the instructor asking
the students a rather simple question: "What does the bank
contract to do, in general terms, when a depositor opens a
c;mecking account?" After eliciting a number of responses, the
1nstructor leads the students to the conclusion that the bank
agrees to pay properly drawn checks on the account to the
holders of the checks up to the balance in the account. The
instructor may write the terrns "properly drawn" and "holders"
on the chalkboard for emphasis.
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